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Abstract 
This paper aims at identifying the effects of divorce alongside on corruption controlling. 
We find no significant effect of divorce on corruption. The same conclusion is found in 
cross-section and panel data.  
Keys-words: Divorce, corruption, Europe 
1. Introduction 
Economists have proposed what can be referred to as the traditional causes of corruption 
(Lambsdorff, 2006; Kodila Tedika, 2012). However, the interest in nontraditional has been 
increasing more and more, recently. These include factors such as age (Torgler & Valev, 
2006), gender (Swamy et al., 2001; Dollar & al, 2001; Sung & Chu, 2003; Sung, 2003; 
Cheung and Hernandez-Julian, 2006; Lavallée & al., 2010), level of intelligence (Potrafke, 
2011), trust (Uslaner, 2004), etc. In the tread, Mocan (2008) documents the bond between 
corruption and civil status on microdata. It is considered in the framework of married, 
divorced, the widows, the single and the living room together. The fact of being unmarried 
appears significant, and the fact of being widowed appears significant in certain regressions. 
The question that we put forth in this study is whether one can find any significant 
relationship between divorce and corruption. Beyond the need of confirming or disagreeing 
with the results in Mocan (2008), this question seems legitimate since it is estimated that 
people who want to divorce to be eager to accelerate the things by lubricating the legal 
machine. Also, psychological work insinuates a rather significant relation between the divorce 
and the level of stress (Lazarus, 1984; Lazarus & al., 1985; Holmes & Rahe, 1967; Kanner & 
al, 1981). In such a case, one can insinuate an effective pertubation to scramble reference. 
Thus, a relation divorce-marriage could appear. What interests us is the direct effect of the 
divorce on corruption.  
In this paper we intend to focus more on divorce, better than the above mentioned article. In 
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addition, this article uses different data, such as European data. And then the sample is 
relatively homogenous. The availability of data conditioned the use of this sample. This focus 
on social norms that fit better the interdisciplinary literature on divorce.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the data and gives 
suggestive evidence. Section 3 describes the empirical specification and estimation strategy. 
Section 4 examines marriage effect of corruption and the conclusions are given in section 5. 
2. Data and Descriptive Evidence 
To examine the relationship between divorce and corruption we collected a cross-section from 
to average 2002-2009 and panel data over the period from 2002 to 2009 for 25 europeans 
countries . The selection of countries as well as the time period is driven by concerns of data 
availability. In addition, we try to follow Kalonda-Kanyama and Kodila Tedika (2012) use 
relatively the same control variables. The variables used are summarized in Tables 1, 2 and 3. 
We describe each variable in turn as following. 
2.1 Divorce and corruption 
The dependent variable is the yearly corruption level from the Transparency International and 
interest variable is the Crude divorce rate (divorces per 1,000 inhabitants), the same data as 
used in Kodila Tedika (2012). To measure corruption, I use the Transparency International's 
Perception of Corruption Index (CPI) for the year 2010. The index assumes values between 
10 (no corruption) and 0 (extreme corruption). The CPI has often been used in empirical 
research on corruption (see i.e. the studies mentioned in section 1).  
The source is Demography report of Eurostat (to see figure 1 to identify the evolution of the 
divorce in time within EU-27). These data have the advantage that they are available for the 
whole time period under consideration and for all UE-27 member countries. In addition, the 
EuroStat has ensured that divorce rates are comparable across the countries. Divorce is not 
legal in Malta. Germany misses certain control variables. Therefore, our estimates are made 
on 25 countries. 
In 2007, 1.2 million divorces took place in the EU-27. The crude divorce rate was 2.1 per 1 
000 inhabitants Eurostat (2011). Regarding the reality of divorce, Ireland (0.8 per 1 000 
inhabitants) and several southern European Member States, including Italy (0.9), Slovenia 
(1.1) and Greece (1.2) have significantly lower crude divorce rates than Belgium (3.0 per 1 
000 inhabitants), Lithuania and the Czech Republic, both with 2.8. According to Figure I, the 
rate of divorce for UE-26 was 1,99 in 1990. In 2009, the trend is positive: it is gone to 2,07. 
There are thus more divorces. 
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Figure 1. Evolution of crude divorce rate in EU-27 (divorce per 1,000 inhabitants) 
 
On average, UE-25 behaves well in terms of corruption, because it represents an average note 
of 6,35. There are nevertheless problematic cases: on the whole, there are 8 nations which 
have a note lower than 5, whereas the best note is 10. Danmark has the highest score, while 
Greece and Romania divide both the note of 3,8/10. 
Table 1: List of countries 
This study uses the data from 25 countries : Belgium; Bulgaria; The Czech Republic; 
Denmark ; Estonia ; Ireland ; Greece ; Spain ; France, including overseas territories; 
'Metropolitan France' excludes overseas territories; Italy ; Cyprus ; Latvia ; Lithuania ; 
Luxembourg ; Hungary ; The Netherlands ; Austria ; Poland ; Portugal ; Romania ; Slovenia ; 
Slovakia ; Finland ; Sweden and The United Kingdom.                                    
                                   Table 2. Summary statistics (Cross-section) 
Variable Obs Mean  Std. Dev. Min  Max   
Divorce  25 2.139  0.6675059 0.775  3.15 
Corruption 25 1.089723 0.7686955 -0.1574431 2.35022 
UE  25 7.711  2.8678  3.6  14.55 
Gender  25 2.248  0.9117697 0.825  4.85 
Infla  25 3.283205 2.061051 1.428242 10.44169 
Helath  25 77.08036 3.186208 71.6244  80.80093 
Density  25 127.1663 103.9401 17.29225 483.9098 
Edu  25 59.98888 16.58317 11.27159 90.95385 
Log GDP per capit25 10.05355 .4774529 9.174291 11.13314 
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Table 3. Summary statistics (Panel data) 
Variable         |      Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max |    Observations 
-----------------+--------------------------------------------+---------------- 
Divorce  overall |     2.139   .6922246         .7        3.8 |     N =     200 
         between |             .6675058       .775       3.15 |     n =      25 
         within  |             .2219998      1.239      3.139 |     T =       8 
Corruption overa |  1.089723   .7648346   -.343059    2.46656 |     N =     200 
         between |             .7686955  -.1574431    2.35022 |     n =      25 
         within  |             .1219193   .7482431   1.418254 |     T =       8 
UE    overall |     7.711   3.527135        2.6       19.9 |     N =     200 
         between |               2.8678        3.6      14.55 |     n =      25 
         within  |             2.122664   .4484998     15.536 |     T =       8 
Gender   overall |     2.248    .972122         .7        7.6 |     N =     200 
         between |             .9117697       .825       4.85 |     n =      25 
         within  |             .3780737      1.098      4.998 |     T =       8 
Infl     overall |  3.283205   2.959149   -4.47994    22.5372 |     N =     200 
         between |             2.061051   1.428242   10.44169 |     n =      25 
         within  |             2.158253  -3.840562   15.37872 |     T =       8 
Health   overall |  77.08036   3.195432    70.8659    81.4756 |     N =     200 
         between |             3.186208    71.6244   80.80094 |     n =      25 
         within  |             .6449525   75.32898    79.3046 |     T =       8 
Density  overall |  127.1663   102.1248    17.0741     490.08 |     N =     200 
         between |             103.9401   17.29225   483.9097 |     n =      25 
         within  |             2.440584   117.9613   137.8873 |     T =       8 
Eud      overall |  59.98888   17.15624    10.3403    95.0721 |     N =     200 
         between |             16.58317   11.27159   90.95385 |     n =      25 
         within  |             5.385976   42.89731   75.69702 |     T =       8 
Log GDP  overall |  10.05355   .4767319   8.964354   11.21336 |     N =     200 
         between |             .4774529   9.174291   11.13314 |     n =      25 
         within  |             .0856203   9.789101   10.28187 |     T =       8 
Before we present our estimation results, it is interesting to visualize the degree of correlation 
between corruption and marriage. Figure 2 provides a first look on the divorce corruption 
nexus.  It plots the divorces rates against corruption for the average 2002-2009. As we can 
see, this figure suggests a positive relationship between divorce and corruption. However, this 
correlation may be misleading, and even not robust. 
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Figure 2. Corruption and Divorce in EU-27 
 
2.2 Controls variables 
The vector  contains several controls variables, which we find in particular at Kalonda-
Kanyama and Kodila Tedika (2012). 
Table 4 Variables description 
Variables  Definitions 
Gender Employers, female (% of employment) 
Log GDP per capita Log GDP per capita PPP (constant 2005 US$) 
Inf Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 
Health Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 
Density Population density (people per sq. km of land area) 
Edu Schoolenrollment, tertiary (% gross) 
UE Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) 
All the control variables  are obtained from the World Development Indicators (2011) of the 
World Bank. 
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3. Empirical Results 
3.1 Estimation strategy 
The baseline econometric model has the following form: 
 
    (1) 
With i = 6,… m representing the various listed countries. 
We estimate the model with ordinary least squares (OLS) and robust standard errors. This 
empirical study uses European cross-sectional data and panel data. For cross-sectional, the 
estimate is made for the average enter 2002-2009 and we use the bootstrap. In econometrics, 
the principal contribution of Bootstrap relates to the improvement of the inference in the 
methods of regression, in particular in small sample in the sense that the estimated parameters 
improve. 
 (2) 
With i = 6,… m representing the various listed countries and n represents temporal dimension. 
We estimate the model with ordinary least squares (OLS) and robust standard errors (Eicker-
White). We use fixed-effects, after the result of Hausmann test. This empirical study uses data 
from 25 european countries over the period from 2002 to 2009.  
3.2 Regression results 
Table 5 shows the baseline regression results. The control variables are statistically significant 
in several cases. Within the framework of the relative relevance of our controls of variable, 
one notices that it is not significant, except for the shadow.  
Within the framework of the absolute relevance of our variable of interest (divorce), one 
notices that it is not significant in all the cases. Given the nature of our data and study, to test 
the robustness of the results is not obvious. In order to check the robustness of the results we 
uses the same variables in panel and cross-section. But the divorce isn’t statistically 
significant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
Table 3. Regression Results. 
Regressors Dependent variable : corruption 
Divorce  -0,07 (0,04) 0,17 (0,16) 
Gender 
0,06 (0,02) *** -0,21 (0,10)** 
Log GDP per capita 
0,54 (0,21)** 1,18 (0,57)** 
Inf 
-0,01 (0,01)*** -0,002 (0,09) 
Health 
-0,03 (0,02) 0,02 (0,06) 
Density 
-0,00 (0,00) 0,00 (0,00) 
Edu 
-0,01 (0,00)*** 0,01 (0,00)** 
UE 
0,00 (0,01) -0,03 (0,04) 
Intercept 
-1,50 (1,72) -12,87 (5,52)** 
Obs. 
200 25 
R² 
0,15 0,78 
Data 
Cross-section Panel data 
 Notes: Absolute value of Std. Err. in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1. 
4. Conclusion 
In recent years the topic of corruption has attracted a great deal of attention. However, there is 
still a lack of substantial empirical evidence about the determinants of corruption. Despite an 
increasing interest of economists in the determinants of corruption, the factor of civil  status 
and was taken into account recently. This article aimed at studying the relation between 
divorce and corruption.  
Using cross-sectional and panel data of the EU-27, we find no statistically significant impact 
of divorce on the corruption level across a range of specifications, at least on our sample. The 
increase in the number of divorce would not push up to corruption. Whereas the marriage 
seems to present a statistically significant effect on the marriage (Nakamwambila 
Kiadiamuyika and Kabanga Kazadi, 2007; Kalonda Kanyama and Kodila Tedika, 2012). We 
can to say, taking into consideration our result, that the divorce is not determinants of 
corruption. 
References 
Cheung, A. and Hernandez-Julian, R., 2006, Gender and Corruption: A Panel Analysis, 
Working papers.  
Dollar, D., Fisman, R. and Gatti, R., 2001, Are Women Really the 'Fairer' Sex? Corruption 
and Women in Government, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 46(4), 423-
429.  
Eurostat 2011, Demography report 2010, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European 
Union. 
8 
 
Holmes, T.H. and Rahe, R.H., 1967, The social read adjustment rating scale, Journal of 
Psychosomatic Research, 11:213-218. 
Kalonda-Kanyama, I. and Kodila Tedika, O., 2012, Marriage and corruption: An empirical 
analysis on European data, submitted. 
Kanner, A.D., Coyne, J.C., Schaefer, C. and Lazarus, R.S., 1981, Comparison of two modes 
of stress measurement: daily hassles and uptifts of stress measurement, Journal of 
Behavioral Medecine, 4: 1-39. 
Kodila Tedika, O., 2012, Causes de la corruption : aperçu empirique, Annales de l’Université 
Marien-Ngouabi, submitted. 
Lambsdorff, J.G., 2006, Consequences and Causes of Corruption: What do We Know from a 
Cross-Section of Countries?, In Rose-Ackermann  (ed),  International Handbook on The 
Economics of Corruption, Edward-Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA, USA, 3-51. 
Lavallée, E., Razafindrakoto, M. and Roubaud, F., 2010, Ce qui engendre la corruption : une 
analyse microéconomique sur données africaines, Revue d'économie du développement. 
24(3) : 5-47.  
Lazarus, R.S., 1984, The trivalization of distress, In B.L.Hammonds et C.J. Scheirer (ed.). 
Psychology and Health : The master lecture series, Washington DC : American 
Psychological Association.. 
Lazarus, R.S., DeLongis, A., Folkman, S.and Gruen, R., 1985, Stress and adaptational 
outcomes: The problem of confounded measures, American Psychologist, 40:770-779. 
Mocan, N., 2008, What Determines Corruption? International Evidence from Microdata, 
Economic Inquiry. 64(4): 439-510.  
Nakamwambila Kiadiamuyika, J. and Kabanga Kazadi, C., 2007, Impact de la pauvreté sur la 
corruption chez les magistrats, les policiers de roulage et les taximen à Kinshasa”, ODHS 
Rapport de recherche N°7.  
Potrafke, N., 2012, Intelligence and Corruption, Economics Letters, 114(1): 109-112.  
Sung, H.-E., 2003, Fairer Sex or Fairer System? Gender and Corruption Revisited, Social 
Forces, 82(2), 703-723.  
Sung, H.-E. and Chu, D., 2003, Does Participation in the Global Economy Reduce Political 
Corruption? An Empirical Inquiry, International Journal of Comparative Criminology, 3(2): 
94-118.  
Swamy, A., Knack, S., Lee, L. and Azfar, O., 2001, Gender and Corruption, Journal of 
Development Economics, 64: 25-55.  
Uslaner, E., 2004, Trust and Corruption. In The New Institutional Economics of Corruption - 
Norms, Trust, and Reciprocity, ed. by J. Graf Lambsdorff, M. Schramm and M. Taube, 
Routledge, London: 76-92. 
 
